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Abstract 
This essay analyzes President Barack Obama’s communication strategies in his speeches and presidential statements 
concerning threats of mass atrocities in Libya, Syria, and Iraq from 2011 through 2015. It examines how he has used 
three rhetorical “frames” to explain events in these countries and to advocate specific U.S. policy responses: the “legal-
istic” (or “liberal internationalist”), the “moralistic,” and the “security” frame. Obama utilized primarily the legalistic 
frame to justify U.S. military intervention in Libya in 2011, and he relied mainly on the security frame (focusing on ter-
rorist threats against U.S. nationals) to justify the deployment of U.S. military forces against ISIL in Iraq and Syria in 
2014−2015. Obama’s rhetorical framing of the violence perpetrated by the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad since 2011 
has been less consistent. Hardly ever in these speeches did Obama suggest that mass atrocities per se constituted a 
threat to U.S. national security—despite the declaration in Obama’s 2011 Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atroci-
ties that “preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest” of the United States. Utilizing an 
approach to linguistic analysis developed by Roman Jakobson, the paper shows how Obama has employed rhetorical 
devices that emphasize the boundaries between the “in-group” of the American national community and the “out-
groups” in other countries who are threatened by mass atrocities. Because members of an in-group are typically de-
picted as warranting greater concern than members of out-groups, Obama’s assignment of victimized communities to 
out-group status has effectively justified inaction by the U.S. government in the face of genocidal violence. 
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1. Introduction 
The opening paragraph of the Albright-Cohen Genocide 
Prevention Task Force report, published a month after 
U.S. President Barack Obama’s election in 2008, de-
scribed genocide as a crime that “threatens not only 
our values, but our national interests” (Albright & Co-
hen, 2008, p. ix). Three years later, President Obama 
reiterated this claim in the opening line of his Presiden-
tial Study Directive on Mass Atrocities (PSD 10) issued 
in August 2011: “Preventing mass atrocities and geno-
cide is a core national security interest and a core mor-
al responsibility of the United States” (Obama, 2011f). 
Many observers believe that the Obama administra-
tion’s record in fulfilling the promise of this presidential 
directive has been mixed. On the positive side of the 
ledger, the U.S. government has put in place mecha-
nisms to facilitate more timely and comprehensive re-
sponses to threats of genocide and mass atrocities 
around the world. For example, in 2013 the U.S. intelli-
gence community issued its first National Intelligence 
Estimate on “Global Risks of Mass Atrocities and Pro-
spects for International Response,” and the interagen-
cy Atrocity Prevention Board (APB) has convened on a 
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monthly basis since 2012 in order to recommend coor-
dinated policy responses to emerging threats. 
Not only has the establishment of the APB provided 
a standing forum for interagency deliberation concern-
ing threats of genocide and mass atrocities, it has also 
stimulated increased attention to this issue within indi-
vidual U.S. government agencies. For example, in the 
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review is-
sued in April 2015, the U.S. State Department flagged 
the issue of “preventing and mitigating conflict and vio-
lent extremism” as the first of four institutional Strate-
gic Priorities. It identified atrocities prevention as one 
of five “lines of effort” to achieve this objective (U.S. De-
partment of State, 2015, p. 24). Likewise, the Depart-
ment of Defense issued guidance on Mass Atrocities Re-
sponse Operations in its 2012 Joint Publication 3-07.03 
on Peace Operations (DOD, 2012, Appendix B), and the 
U.S. Agency for International for International Develop-
ment (USAID) has published an operational field guide 
entitled Helping Prevent Mass Atrocities (2015). 
This new doctrine and administrative machinery for 
atrocities prevention within the U.S. government have 
facilitated more robust and sustained attention to civil 
strife in countries of otherwise peripheral interest to 
senior U.S. policymakers, including Burma, Kenya, Bu-
rundi, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan. 
But the APB has achieved little traction in influencing 
the administration’s policy priorities in regions of more 
central concern to U.S. national security, such as North 
Africa, Syria, and Iraq. In the words of Jim Finkel (2014), 
a former senior U.S. government official who was a key 
participant in the APB, 
The Board continues to be viewed skeptically—and 
occasionally even hostilely—from some quarters 
within the national security establishment….Despite 
regular assurances from senior levels within the 
White House that the President feels strongly about 
the atrocity prevention initiative he endorsed, there 
have been persistent signs that parts of the bureau-
cracy remain skeptical of the policy and the Presi-
dent’s “real” intent. This initial skepticism has only 
grown as the debates over Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Syria have unfolded (pp. 1, 27). 
This essay will analyze President Obama’s rhetorical 
framing of the atrocities prevention agenda. Through a 
close reading of fifteen presidential speeches and 
statements delivered between 2011 and 2015, I will 
examine how Obama has discussed potential or actual 
incidents of mass atrocities in Libya, Syria, and Iraq. In 
particular, I will explore how he has utilized three rhe-
torical “frames” to describe the violence in these coun-
tries and to prescribe the U.S. government’s policy re-
sponse: 
 The legalistic (or liberal internationalist) frame, 
which depicts the violence as a violation of hu-
man rights and international law; 
 The moralistic frame, which emphasizes the bru-
tality of the perpetrators and the suffering of the 
victims; and 
 The security frame, which stresses the potential 
threats that the violence poses to American citi-
zens and the U.S. homeland. 
In most of the speeches and presidential statements 
analyzed here, all three of these frames appeared to a 
greater or lesser extent, but one or two were typically 
dominant. For example, the legalistic frame dominated 
most of Obama’s speeches concerning Libya in 2011–
2012, whereas the security frame was overwhelmingly 
emphasized in most of his speeches regarding the Is-
lamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 2014−2015. 
In Obama’s speeches on Syria between 2011 and 2013, 
the pattern was less coherent: the President vacillated 
between describing the violence perpetrated by the 
Assad regime as a violation of international law, as a 
moral outrage, and as a threat to U.S. national security. 
Although President Obama’s speeches and state-
ments during this period regularly employed a range of 
frames to discuss regions at risk of genocide or mass 
atrocities, virtually never—except in PSD 10 itself and 
in his April 2012 speech at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial 
Museum unveiling the Atrocity Prevention Board 
(Obama, 2012a)—did he depict mass atrocities per se 
as a threat to U.S. national security interests. Indeed, in 
his September 2013 speech to the UN General Assem-
bly, the President pointedly excluded atrocities preven-
tion from his list of “America’s core interests” (Obama, 
2013d). Based on the record of these public speeches, 
the nameless bureaucrats to whom Finkel alludes in his 
paper would appear justified in their skepticism about 
the “President’s ‘real’ intent” concerning the atrocities 
prevention agenda. 
The essay concludes that President Obama’s incon-
sistent framing of the challenge of atrocities preven-
tion has resulted in missed opportunities for advancing 
U.S. national interests. In a volatile era characterized 
by unconventional and asymmetric security threats, 
the U.S. government and its international partners con-
front challenges not only to their military power but al-
so to the moral legitimacy of their authority. A key stra-
tegic objective of emerging adversaries such as the 
Islamic State is to undermine the legitimacy and credi-
bility of the U.S. and its allies through the commission 
of mass atrocities and other acts of violence against ci-
vilian noncombatants (Cronin, 2012, 2015; Naji, 
2004/2006). Although, in any given situation, U.S. 
leaders may labor under policy constraints that limit 
their capacity to take effective preventive action, it is 
essential to articulate a clear and consistent set of 
principles to inform and explain their decisions. Signal-
ing a robust commitment to atrocities prevention—
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both through words and through deeds—is a critical 
component of the broader effort to reinforce the legit-
imacy of American power. 
2. Reframing the Strategic Narrative: Atrocities 
Prevention as a Security Interest 
In the 2003 study “A Problem from Hell”: America and 
the Age of Genocide, Samantha Power presented a 
stinging critique of the U.S. government’s passivity in 
the face of genocidal violence over the course of the 
twentieth century. Writing a decade before she her-
self became U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, 
Power pointed out that “the United States has con-
sistently refused to take risks in order to suppress 
genocide.” Because “America’s ‘vital national inter-
ests’ were not considered imperiled by mere geno-
cide,” she asserted, “senior U.S. officials did not give 
genocide the moral attention it warranted” (Power, 
2003, p. 504). 
Power argued that the U.S. government should act 
more decisively in the face of genocidal violence, not 
only on moral grounds but also on the basis of “en-
lightened self-interest”: 
[S]ecurity for Americans at home and abroad is con-
tingent on international stability, and there is per-
haps no greater source of havoc than a group of 
well-armed extremists bent on wiping out a people 
on ethnic, national, or religious grounds. Western 
governments have generally tried to contain geno-
cide by appeasing its architects. But the sad record 
of the last century shows that the walls the United 
States tries to build around genocidal societies al-
most inevitably shatter. States that murder and 
torment their own citizens target citizens else-
where….Citizens victimized by genocide or aban-
doned by the international community do not make 
good neighbors, as their thirst for vengeance, their 
irredentism, and their acceptance of violence as a 
means of generating change can turn them into fu-
ture threats (Power, 2003, p. 513). 
The 2008 report of the Albright-Cohen Genocide Pre-
vention Task Force echoed the themes sounded in 
Power’s book, describing genocide and mass atroci-
ties not only as “a direct assault on universal human 
values, including most fundamentally the right to 
life,” but also as a threat to “core U.S. national inter-
ests.” The report observed: 
[G]enocide fuels instability, usually in weak, un-
democratic, and corrupt states. It is in these same 
types of states that we find terrorist recruitment 
and training, human trafficking, and civil strife, all of 
which have damaging spillover effects for the entire 
world. (Albright & Cohen, 2008, p. xx) 
By failing to take timely preventive action, the report 
declared, “we inevitably bear greater costs—in feeding 
millions of refugees and trying to manage long-lasting 
regional crises.” Moreover, 
America’s standing in the world—and our ability to 
lead—is eroded when we are perceived as bystand-
ers to genocide. We cannot be viewed as a global 
leader and respected as an international partner if 
we cannot take steps to avoid one of the greatest 
scourges of humankind. No matter how one calcu-
lates U.S. interests, the reality of our world today is 
that national borders provide little sanctuary from 
international problems. Left unchecked, genocide 
will undermine American security. (Albright & Co-
hen, 2008, pp. xv, xx) 
Both Power’s book and the Albright-Cohen report 
started from the premise that moral or humanitarian 
concerns alone were insufficient grounds for motivat-
ing action by senior U.S. policymakers. Instead, they 
argued, it was essential to reframe atrocities preven-
tion as a national security priority. In addition to imper-
iling “universal human values” including “the right to 
life,” they contended, mass atrocities undermined in-
ternational stability, facilitated “terrorist recruitment 
and training,” and promoted the “acceptance of vio-
lence as a means of generating change.” 
The sociologist Ervin Goffman (1974) has defined a 
“frame” as an interpretive schema for organizing and 
making meaning out of otherwise chaotic social expe-
rience. He notes that a frame “allows its user to locate, 
perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite num-
ber of concrete occurrences defined in its terms” (p. 
21). A frame may take many forms. It may consist of an 
explicitly formulated set of principles (e.g. the rules to 
a game of checkers or chess), but more often it is 
amorphous and articulated only implicitly—involving a 
set of shared values, assumptions, narratives, meta-
phors, or social conventions. In recent decades, the 
concept of framing has made inroads into a wide range 
of fields including psychology (e.g. Levin & Schneider, 
1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), behavioral econom-
ics (Kahneman, 2003), public health (Dorfman, Wallack, 
& Woodruff, 2005), media studies (Scheufele, 1999), 
and electoral politics (Lakoff, 1996, 2004; Lempert & 
Silverstein, 2012). 
One common framing device is what the interna-
tional relations scholar Lawrence Freedman (2006) 
calls the strategic narrative: a “compelling story” that 
“can explain events convincingly and from which infer-
ences can be drawn” (p. 22). In the context of contem-
porary international conflict, in which small organiza-
tions such as insurgencies and terrorist groups can 
exert influence that far exceeds their material re-
sources, strategic narratives are particularly important 
framing devices. As John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt 
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(2001) point out, narratives “provide a grounded ex-
pression of people’s experiences, interests and val-
ues.” They both “express a sense of identity and be-
longing” and “communicate a sense of cause, 
purpose, and mission” (p. 328; see also Levinger, 
2013, pp. 113-134; Martinez, Agoglia, & Levinger, 
2013). This enables dispersed groups to define and 
pursue a common mission in the absence of a central-
ized hierarchical authority. 
If strategic narratives are essential for non-state ac-
tors seeking to exert influence on the global stage, they 
are equally vital for those at the pinnacle of power—
such as heads of state—who need to motivate and co-
ordinate actions by thousands or even millions of sub-
ordinates, as well as to build and sustain coalitions in-
volving diverse domestic constituencies and 
international partners. Especially in times of crisis or 
rapid change, international leadership is inextricably in-
tertwined with the practice of storytelling. 
This essay will analyze three ways in which Presi-
dent Obama has framed the stories he has told about 
potential or actual incidents of mass atrocities in Libya, 
Syria, and Iraq: the “legalistic” (or “liberal internation-
alist”), the “moralistic,” and the “security” frame. I use 
the terms “legalistic” and “moralistic,” rather than “le-
gal” and “moral,” because these speeches contain little 
rigorous legal or moral reasoning. Moreover, many of 
Obama’s security-related arguments in these speeches 
utilized visceral and emotionally laden words such as 
“plots,” “threats,” “9/11,” and “terrorists,” rather than 
more neutral terms such as “national security” or “na-
tional interests.” In a sense, one might surmise that 
Obama’s principal objective in these speeches was to 
convey the aura of legality, morality, and security (or il-
legality, immorality, and insecurity), rather than an 
iron-clad logical exposition. 
3. Methodology 
The paper analyzes fifteen presidential speeches and 
statements delivered between 2011 and 2015. Five of 
these speeches or statements discuss the conflict in 
Libya (2011–2012), five discuss the conflict in Syria, fo-
cusing on actions by the regime of Syrian president Ba-
shar al-Assad (2011–2013), and five discuss the U.S. re-
sponse to actions by the Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL) (2014–2015). The essay utilizes two meth-
ods for analyzing these documents, one quantitative 
and the other qualitative. The quantitative method in-
volves comparing the frequencies of “legalistic,” “mor-
alistic,” and “security-related” words in the speeches. 
The qualitative method draws on work by the linguist 
Roman Jakobson on the “poetics” of language, which 
explores how the meaning of a text is shaped through 
the use of patterns of repetition and contrast (Jakob-
son, 1960; see also Levinger, 1990, Lempert & Silver-
stein, 2012). 
3.1. The Quantitative Method: Calculating Word 
Frequencies 
In the conduct of foreign policy, the U.S. president is a 
uniquely powerful individual. Unlike in the domestic 
arena, where the president is often reduced to the 
role of “cajoler-in-chief”—catering to the demands of 
Congress, the courts, interest groups, and campaign 
donors, among others—in his dealings overseas the 
president possesses the de jure or de facto authority 
to act with considerable autonomy. For example, he 
can initiate limited military attacks (including bomb-
ing raids and drone or cruise missile strikes), establish 
no-fly zones, deploy U.S. military personnel for hu-
manitarian operations or other short-term missions, 
impose sanctions, and engage in bilateral and multi-
lateral diplomatic initiatives, without Congressional 
approval.  
Although, in the short run, the President often has 
the capacity to act unilaterally without having to per-
suade his constituents of the wisdom, legitimacy, or 
even the legality of his decisions, persuasive public 
communication is essential in at least three respects: 
First, the President must enlist support for his policies 
from the U.S. Congress and U.S. public opinion in order 
to sustain resource-intensive foreign policy initiatives 
over the long term. Second, the President often needs 
to recruit support from international partners and neu-
tralize international opposition. Finally, the President 
may find it useful to signal American intentions and re-
solve to potential enemies in order to increase U.S. 
leverage and deter hostile acts. 
By calculating the frequencies with which Presi-
dent Obama has used various types of words in 
speeches concerning potential or actual incidents of 
mass atrocities, we can determine which rhetorical 
frame he considered most likely to persuade his do-
mestic and international audiences in particular situa-
tions. Moreover, we can distinguish the rhetorical 
strategies that he employed when he wanted to justi-
fy robust action by the U.S. government from those 
he employed when he wanted to justify inaction, or 
only symbolic action, in response to atrocities. The 
words associated with the legalistic, moralistic, and 
security frames are shown in Table 1. 
The frequencies of each of these clusters of words 
are calculated as in the examples below: 
The Legalistic (Liberal Internationalist) Frame (Lib-
ya, February 2013):  
“[T]hroughout this period of unrest and upheaval 
across the region the United States has maintained 
a set of core principles which guide our ap-
proach….These actions violate international norms 
and every standard of common decency….The 
United States also strongly supports the universal 
rights of the Libyan people. That includes the rights 
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of peaceful assembly, free speech, and the ability 
of the Libyan people to determine their own desti-
ny. These are human rights. They are not negotia-
ble” (Obama, 2011a). 
Frequency: 130 words per 1,000 (10 words out of 
77) 
The Moralistic Frame (ISIL, September 2014): 
“In a region that has known so much bloodshed, 
these terrorists are unique in their brutality. They 
execute captured prisoners. They kill children. They 
enslave, rape, and force women into marriage” 
(Obama, 2014b). 
Frequency: 161 words per 1,000 (5 words out of 31) 
The Security Frame (ISIL, September 2014): 
“Still, we continue to face a terrorist threat. We 
cannot erase every trace of evil from the world, and 
small groups of killers have the capacity to do great 
harm. That was the case before 9/11, and that re-
mains true today. That's why we must remain vigi-
lant as threats emerge. At this moment, the great-
est threats come from the Middle East and North 
Africa, where radical groups exploit grievances for 
their own gain” (Obama, 2014b). 
Frequency: 110 words per 1,000 (8 words out of 73) 




democra#, free#, global#, 
human#, international#, law#, 
legal#, norm#, peace#, 
principle#, right#, rule#, 
universal#, value# 
Moralistic Words atroc#, attack# (other), blood#, 
brutal#, destroy# (other), 
destruction (other), evil#, 
genoc#, horr#, innocent#, kill# 
(other), massacre#, murder# 
(other), rape#, slaughter#, 




Visceral 9/11, Al Qaeda, attack# (US), 
destroy# (US), destruction (US), 
kill# (US), murder# (US), plot#, 
terror#, threat#, vigilant#, 
violen# (US) 
Abstract aggress#, extrem#, interest#, 
national#, radical#, secur# 
As these examples reveal, the coding methodology 
employed here is more art than science. Certain words 
are omitted from the word count that arguably should 
be included (e.g. “standard,” “assembly,” “determine,” 
“negotiable” in the legalistic frame; “execute” and 
“force” in the moralistic frame; “harm” in the security 
frame). Moreover, the boundaries among the various 
frames are amorphous. For example, the moralistic 
passage quoted above includes the word “terrorists,” 
which is coded as a security-related word. Conversely, 
the security-related passage contains the word “evil,” 
coded as a moralistic word. 
Perhaps most interestingly, certain words (at-
tack#, destroy#, destruction, kill#, murder#, violen#) 
migrate between categories, depending on the con-
texts in which they are used. They are coded as mor-
alistic words if they refer, implicitly or explicitly, to vi-
olence against non-American victim groups. The same 
terms are coded as visceral security-related words if 
they refer, implicitly or explicitly, to violence involving 
Americans. In the above examples, the word “kill” in 
the sentence, “They kill children,” is coded as a moral-
istic word; whereas the word “killers” in the phrase 
“small groups of killers” is coded as a security-related 
word. 
Although this word-counting methodology is rough, 
it reveals striking patterns in President Obama’s choice 
of rhetorical strategies for describing incidents of mass 
atrocities in North Africa and the Middle East, which 
will be discussed below. 
3.2. The Qualitative Method: Analyzing Poetics 
One key—and perhaps unsurprising—finding of this 
essay is that rhetoric about violence directed against 
members of the “in-group” (those closely associated 
with the American national community) is far more 
likely to motivate robust policy responses by the U.S. 
government than rhetoric about similar acts of vio-
lence directed against members of “out-groups” 
(those seen as outsiders to the American national 
community). Thus, for example, “small groups of kill-
ers” who threaten the U.S. homeland are more likely 
to attract a vigorous response than groups that “kill 
children” in Iraq. Yet, political leaders have consider-
able flexibility in terms of how and where they draw 
the boundaries between the in-group and the out-
group. For example, depending on the context, citi-
zens of close U.S. allies such as the United Kingdom or 
Israel might be characterized as in-group members, 
whereas citizens of other allied states such as India or 
Saudi Arabia might be relegated to the out-group. 
In a classic essay on “Linguistics and Poetics,” Ro-
man Jakobson observed that the semiotic content of a 
text is determined not only by its “referential func-
tion” (the ways in which language points to objects 
and phenomena in the world) but also by its “poetic 
function” (the ways in which meaning is constructed 
through the juxtaposition of particular elements of a 
text with each other). “In poetry,” he wrote, “any se-
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quence of semantic units strives to build an equation. 
Similarity superimposed on contiguity imparts to po-
etry its thoroughgoing symbolic, multiplex, polyse-
mantic essence.” Just as “words similar in sound are 
drawn together in meaning,” the reiteration of pat-
terns of parallels and contrasts in a text results in the 
“reification of a poetic message” and the “conversion 
of a message into an enduring thing” (Jakobson, 1960, 
pp. 370-371). 
In political speeches, meanings are established 
and reinforced in large part through the strategic use 
of the “poetic function.” This is especially true for 
gifted political orators such as Barack Obama, who 
first catapulted to national fame on the basis of an ex-
tended poem that he delivered as the keynote ad-
dress to the Democratic National Convention in July 
2004: 
[T]here’s not a liberal America and a conservative 
America; there’s the United States of America. 
There’s not a black America and white America and 
Latino America and Asian America; there’s the 
United States of America….We are one people, all 
of us pledging allegiance to the stars and stripes, all 
of us defending the United States of America 
(Obama, 2004). 
An analysis of the poetic structure of President 
Obama’s political speeches on Libya, Syria, and ISIL can 
illuminate the ways in which he draws the line be-
tween the in-group and the out-groups—and implicitly, 
the ways in which he argues for either bold or tepid 
policy responses to threats of mass atrocities. Table 2 
presents a poetic analysis of a passage from Obama’s 
speech of September 10, 2014 in which he announced 
the expansion of the U.S. military campaign to “de-
grade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group known 
as ISIL” (Obama, 2014b). 
Two paragraphs of this speech were devoted to 
celebrating the success of the U.S. rescue effort for 
members of Iraq’s Yezidi community who had been 
trapped by ISIL forces on Mt. Sinjar in Northern Iraq. In 
a speech delivered five weeks earlier, on August 7, 
Obama had described the Yezidi as a “small and an-
cient sect.” He had declared that “ISIL forces below 
have called for the systematic destruction of the entire 
Yezidi people, which would constitute genocide” 
(Obama, 2014a). 
In the September 10 speech, Obama praised the ef-
forts of American “pilots who bravely fly in the face of 
danger above the Middle East” in order to defend 
threatened civilians:  
When we helped prevent the massacre of civilians 
trapped on a distant mountain, here's what one of 
them said: “We owe our American friends our lives. 
Our children will always remember that there was 
someone who felt our struggle and made a long 
journey to protect innocent people.” That is the dif-
ference we make in the world. And our own safe-
ty—our own security—depends upon our willing-
ness to do what it takes to defend this nation, and 
uphold the values that we stand for—timeless ide-
als that will endure long after those who offer only 
hate and destruction have been vanquished from 
the Earth. (Obama, 2014b) 
Table 2 charts the relationships between “in-group” 
(on the left) and “out-groups” (on the right) in the 
above passage. 
This passage seamlessly combines the moralistic 
frame (preventing “the massacre of innocent civilians 
trapped on a distant mountain”) with the security 
frame (vanquishing terrorists “who offer only hate 
and destruction”). As Table 2 indicates through the 
use of boldface words, the passage also knits together 
two groups identified by the word “we”: the Ameri-
can saviors (on the left) and the Yezidi innocents (on 
the right). The grammatical structure of the first sen-
tence is particularly clever: “When we helped prevent 
the massacre of civilians trapped on a distant moun-
tain, here’s what one of them said: ‘We owe our 
American friends [them] our lives.’” By the end of the 
sentence, the initial “we” has become “them,” and 
the initial “them” has become “we,” suggesting an in-
timate bond between the rescuer and the rescued. 
This bond is accentuated by the intimacy of the verbs 
in the passage: the Yezidi say that the Americans “felt 
our struggle,” and they pledge that their “children will 
always remember” their benefactors. 
Despite the mutual empathy that Obama indicates 
exists between the Americans and the Yezidi, he is al-
so careful to highlight both the geographic and the 
cultural distance between these two groups. The 
Americans had to make a “long journey” to a “distant 
mountain” (which they flew “above”) in order to save 
the Yezidi. Moreover, the Yezidi are passive: they 
“say” how grateful they are, they “owe” the Ameri-
cans their lives, they promise to “remember” their 
benefactors. The Americans, by contrast, are actively 
heroic: they “prevent the massacre of civilians,” they 
“protect innocent people,” they “do what it takes to 
defend this nation,” and they will “vanquish” terror-
ists “from the earth.” Their actions above that distant 
mountain were altruistic: at no point does Obama 
suggest that the security of the American people de-
pended upon the survival of the Yezidi. 
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Table 2. The poetics of persuasion—Saving the Yezidi and Bombing ISIL. 
In-Group Verb Phrase Out-Group 
(+) = positively valued 
(-) = negatively valued 
When   
we helped prevent the massacre of civilians trapped on a distant mountain (+) 
 here’s what one of them (+) 
 said:  
  We (+) 
 owe  
our American friends   
  our lives. (+) 
  Our children (+) 
 will always remember that there was  
someone who felt our struggle (+) 
 and made a long journey to protect innocent people. (+) 
   
This is the difference   
we make in the world.  
And our own safety—   
our own security— depends upon  
our willingness to defend  
this nation,  and uphold  
the values that we stand for—  
timeless ideals that will endure long after those who offer only hate and destruction (-) 
 have been vanquished from the earth.  
 
4. Case Studies 
Table 3 shows the frequency (per 1,000 words) with 
which President Obama used legalistic, moralistic, 
and security-related words (as identified above in Ta-
ble 1) in fifteen speeches concerning Libya, Syria, and 
ISIL delivered between February 2011 and February 
2015. The word clusters with the highest frequencies 
(greater than 10 per 1,000 words) are shown in bold-
face. A frequency of 10 per 1,000 words corresponds 
to approximately one word per paragraph of a written 
text—or one word per minute in the delivery of a 
speech.  
The Libya speeches analyzed here include four 
speeches from 2011 and one from 2012. The first 
three (of February 23, March 18, and March 28, 2011) 
were delivered before and during the UN-authorized 
military intervention in Libya that began on March 19. 
The fourth speech (of September 20, 2011) was deliv-
ered at the UN four weeks after the fall of Tripoli to 
rebel forces; and the fifth (of September 25, 2012) 
was Obama’s annual address to the UN General As-
sembly delivered two weeks after the killing of U.S. 
Ambassador Chris Stevens in Benghazi (Obama, 
2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011h, 2012c). 
The Syria speeches include two early condemna-
tions of President Bashar al-Assad’s use of violence 
against civilians (of April 22 and August 18, 2011), fol-
lowed by two speeches denouncing the Syrian re-
gime’s use of chemical weapons (August 31 and Sep-
tember 10, 2013) and Obama’s address to the UN 
General Assembly on September 24, 2013, which de-
voted considerable attention to the Syrian conflict 
(Obama, 2011d, 2011g, 2013a, 2013c, 2013d). 
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Table 3. Word frequencies in President Obama’s speeches on Libya, Syria, and ISIL, 2011–2015 (per 1,000 words). 
Libya-related Speeches 2011–2012 
Date 2/23/11 3/18/11 3/28/11 9/20/11 9/25/12 
Word count 789 1257 3410 1769 4052 
Legalistic words 38.02 22.28 11.73 13.57 20.48 
Moralistic words 8.87 13.52 9.68 6.78 4.69 
Security-related words 5.07 4.77 6.45 7.35 9.87 
Visceral 1.27 1.59 1.17 2.83 5.92 
Abstract 3.80 3.18 4.69 4.52 3.95 
Syria-related Speeches 2011–2013 
Date 4/22/11 8/18/11 8/31/13 9/10/13 9/24/13 
Word count 320 691 1435 2205 5530 
Legalistic words 37.50 18.81 9.06 16.33 18.63 
Moralistic words 12.50 11.58 6.97 6.35 5.97 
Security-related words 15.63 1.45 6.97 12.24 11.57 
Visceral 6.25 0.00 0.70 6.34 3.98 
Abstract 9.38 1.45 6.27 5.90 7.59 
ISIL-related Speeches 2014–2015 
Date 8/7/14 9/10/14 9/23/14 2/11/15 2/19/15 
Word count 488 1832 531 1206 2500 
Legalistic words 8.20 7.64 1.88 4.98 10.00 
Moralistic words 22.54 8.73 0.00 2.49 5.60 
Security-related words 28.69 31.66 37.66 19.90 25.20 
Visceral 22.54 24.02 33.90 14.10 19.60 
Abstract 6.15 7.64 3.77 5.80 5.60 
 
The ISIL speeches begin with Obama’s announcement 
on August 7, 2014 that he has authorized military op-
erations to defend U.S. personnel in Iraq, as well as Ye-
zidi civilians trapped on Mt. Sinjar in Iraq and threat-
ened with destruction by ISIL. The next two speeches 
(September 10 and September 23, 2014) report on the 
progress of the campaign against ISIL. The fourth 
speech (February 11, 2015) offers a further status re-
port on U.S. and coalition military operations in Iraq 
and Syria against ISIL; and the fifth speech is Obama’s 
address to the Summit on Countering Violent Extrem-
ism held at the U.S. State Department on February 19, 
2015 (Obama, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2015a, 2015b). 
Several initial conclusions can be drawn from the 
patterns of word use identified in Table 3: 
(1) Obama’s speeches on Libya in 2011–2012 were 
all dominated by the legalistic (or liberal inter-
nationalist) frame, and his speeches on ISIL in 
2014–2015 were all dominated by the security 
frame. 
(2) In both the Libya-related and the ISIL-related 
speeches, the framing showed a high degree of 
“stickiness.” In other words, Obama continued 
to frame the events on the ground in similar 
ways despite sometimes dramatic changes in 
the international and U.S. domestic political 
context. For example, Obama’s speech to the 
UN General Assembly about Libya in September 
2012, which was delivered after the killing of 
Ambassador Chris Stevens in Benghazi, and in 
the midst of the 2012 U.S. presidential cam-
paign, discussed the conflict in similar terms as 
his initial speeches justifying the U.S. military in-
tervention in Libya in February-March 2011. 
Likewise, there was a high degree of continuity 
in Obama’s framing of the U.S. response to ISIL 
from the onset of U.S. military operations in Iraq 
in August 2014 through the Countering Violent 
Extremism address in February 2015. 
(3) In addressing the conflict in Syria, Obama also 
favored the legalistic frame, but the pattern was 
less consistent, with the moralistic and security 
frames appearing to a greater or lesser extent in 
different contexts. 
(4) The most significant pattern in Obama’s public 
communication concerning the conflict in Syria 
was his relative silence on this topic. From Au-
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gust 2011 until August 2013, as the security and 
humanitarian conditions in Syria disintegrated, 
Obama rarely spoke publicly at any length about 
the conflict. The notable exceptions were a 
press conference and a speech in 2012 in which 
he warned the Assad regime against the use of 
chemical weapons. 
(5) In none of the fifteen speeches analyzed here 
was moralistic framing alone utilized to justify a 
robust U.S. response to potential or actual mass 
atrocities. Moralistic framing appeared along-
side the dominant legalistic framing in Obama’s 
initial speeches about Libya in March-April 2011, 
and alongside the dominant security framing in 
his initial speeches about ISIL in August-
September 2014. In both cases, the moralistic 
framing subsided in his subsequent speeches on 
these topics. 
Each of these findings is discussed in further detail be-
low. 
4.1. Libya: Democracy Ascendant 
The 2008 report of the Genocide Prevention Task Force 
placed so much emphasis on the relationship between 
atrocities prevention and U.S. national security largely 
because the task force members believed that senior 
policymakers would take decisive action to avert geno-
cide or mass atrocities only if they believed that core 
U.S. national security interests were at stake.  
At first blush, President Obama’s rhetoric concern-
ing the Libya crisis in 2011 appears to undermine this 
premise. The legalistic (or liberal internationalist) 
frame dominated his speeches of February and March 
2011, when the U.S. was planning and initiating its mili-
tary response to the Qaddafi regime’s offensive in 
Eastern Libya. Legalistic words occurred 38.02 and 
22.28 times per thousand words in his speeches of 
February 23 and March 18 respectively, followed by 
moralistic words (8.87 and 13.52 words per thousand). 
The security frame was a distant third (5.07 and 4.77 
words per thousand), and hardly any of the security-
related terms were visceral words like “terrorism” or 
“9/11.” 
In delivering an ultimatum to Libyan President 
Moammar Qaddafi on March 18, the day before initiat-
ing U.S. military strikes, Obama described the stakes of 
the conflict as follows: 
Now, here is why this matters to us. Left un-
checked, we have every reason to believe that 
Qaddafi would commit atrocities against his people. 
Many thousands could die. A humanitarian crisis 
would ensue. The entire region could be destabi-
lized, endangering many of our allies and partners. 
The calls of the Libyan people for help would go un-
answered. The democratic values that we stand for 
would be overrun. Moreover, the words of the in-
ternational community would be rendered hollow. 
And that’s why the United States has worked with 
our allies and partners to shape a strong interna-
tional response at the United Nations. Our focus 
has been clear: protecting innocent civilians within 
Libya, and holding the Qaddafi regime accountable. 
(Obama, 2011b) 
As James Mann observes, Obama’s decision to initiate 
a humanitarian intervention in Libya was “momen-
tous.” According to Mann, most officials within the 
Obama administration believed that Libya “was not it-
self of compelling strategic interest to the United 
States; America’s only arguable strategic interest on 
this issue lay in maintaining strong relationships with 
close allies who were supporting the United States 
elsewhere in the world” (Mann, 2012, p. xv). 
The military intervention in Libya took place at an 
extraordinary historical moment, in the midst of the 
euphoria following the relatively quick and peaceful 
revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. Qaddafi had issued 
chilling warnings against the people of Benghazi and 
other cities in Eastern Libya, which were reminiscent of 
the threats by Rwanda’s génocidaires that had preced-
ed the killing of 800,000 Rwandan Tutsi and moderate 
Hutu in that country in 1994 (Chollet & Fishman, 2015, 
pp. 154-155). Moreover, Libya’s desert landscape, and 
the geographic separation of regime forces in the coun-
try’s West from the rebel-held cities in the East, made it 
feasible for the U.S. and its allies to intervene militarily 
without putting large numbers of civilians at risk. 
The U.S. leadership role in Operation Odyssey 
Dawn, the military operation against Qaddafi’s forces 
that began on March 19, 2011, lasted only about a 
week. Before unleashing attacks on Libyan air defenses 
and key military targets, Obama had secured an 
agreement with British Prime Minister David Cameron 
and French president Nicolas Sarkozy that  
after a few days, the United States would step back 
and leave it to the British, French and other allies to 
continue the military campaign on their own….After 
the first few days, Obama kept American forces out 
of the combat, despite occasional British and 
French appeals to the United States to rejoin the air 
campaign. (Mann, 2012, p. xvi) 
The limited duration and scope of the U.S. military in-
tervention in Libya suggests that the power of liberal 
internationalist rhetoric to motivate vigorous respons-
es to threats of mass atrocities remains unproven.  
One striking dimension of Obama’s Libya-related 
speeches is that, although he employed liberal interna-
tionalist rhetoric to justify the initial U.S.-led military 
intervention in early 2011, he subsequently used the 
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same rhetorical framing strategy to justify American 
inaction as the security situation in Libya deteriorated. 
In September of that year, after the Libyan rebels had 
seized control of Tripoli but while Qaddafi still re-
mained at large, Obama congratulated the people of 
Libya on “writing a new chapter in the life of their na-
tion” by building a “a future that is free and democratic 
and prosperous.” Obama declared:  
Now, even as we speak, remnants of the old regime 
continue to fight. Difficult days are still ahead. But 
one thing is clear -- the future of Libya is now in the 
hands of the Libyan people. For just as it was Liby-
ans who tore down the old order, it will be Libyans 
who build their new nation. (Obama, 2011g) 
A year later, Obama addressed the UN General Assem-
bly under less auspicious circumstances. On September 
11, 2012, the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens, 
was killed along with three of his colleagues in an at-
tack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi. The Interna-
tional Crisis Group issued a report describing this inci-
dent as “a stark reminder of Libya’s security 
challenges” that should “serve as a wake-up call.” Lib-
ya, it warned, was devolving into “a country of regions 
and localities pulling in different directions, beset by in-
tercommunal strife and where well-armed groups 
freely roam” (International Crisis Group, 2012). 
Yet Obama, while mourning Stevens’ death and 
promising to be “relentless in tracking down the killers 
and bringing them to justice,” remained upbeat about 
Libya’s prospects in his September 25 speech at the 
UN: 
[E]ven as there will be huge challenges to come 
with a transition to democracy, I am convinced that 
ultimately government of the people, by the peo-
ple, and for the people is more likely to bring about 
the stability, prosperity, and individual opportunity 
that serve as a basis for peace in our world. So let 
us remember that this is a season of progress. For 
the first time in decades, Tunisians, Egyptians and 
Libyans voted for new leaders in elections that 
were credible, competitive, and fair. This democrat-
ic spirit has not been restricted to the Arab world…. 
Around the globe, people are making their voices 
heard, insisting on their innate dignity, and the right 
to determine their future (Obama, 2012c). 
In other words, because democracy was on the march 
during this “season of progress,” the wake-up call 
sounded by the International Crisis Group and other 
organizations could be put on hold. 
4.2. Syria: The Long Silence 
One of the most striking aspects of President Obama’s 
public comments concerning the crisis in Syria since 
2011 has been their rarity. On April 22, 2011, Obama 
issued a 300-word statement condemning “in the 
strongest possible terms the use of force by the Syrian 
government against demonstrators” and warning: 
“This outrageous use of violence to quell protests must 
come to an end now” (Obama, 2011d). Four weeks lat-
er, on May 19, he devoted three paragraphs of a 
speech on the Middle East and North Africa to discuss-
ing the situation in Syria. In this speech, Obama again 
condemned the violence and announced stepped-up 
sanctions against the Syrian regime. Obama declared:  
The Syrian people have shown their courage in de-
manding a transition to democracy. President Assad 
now has a choice: he can lead that transition, or get 
out of the way (Obama, 2011e). 
President Obama’s next public remarks on Syria did not 
come until three months later, on August 18, 2011, 
when he issued a 700-word statement accompanying 
an executive order that further tightened financial and 
trade sanctions on the Syrian government. In this 
statement, Obama reiterated the themes found in his 
earlier comments on this conflict: 
The future of Syria must be determined by its peo-
ple, but President Bashar al-Assad is standing in 
their way. His calls for dialogue and reform have 
rung hollow while he is imprisoning, torturing, and 
slaughtering his own people. We have consistently 
said that President Assad must lead a democratic 
transition or get out of the way. He has not led. For 
the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come 
for President Assad to step aside. The United States 
cannot and will not impose this transition upon Syr-
ia. It is up to the Syrian people to choose their own 
leaders, and we have heard their strong desire that 
there not be foreign intervention in their move-
ment. What the United States will support is an ef-
fort to bring about a Syria that is democratic, just, 
and inclusive for all Syrians. We will support this 
outcome by pressuring President Assad to get out 
of the way of this transition, and standing up for 
the universal rights of the Syrian people along with 
others in the international community (Obama, 
2011g). 
As shown in Table 2, this speech was dominated by the 
legalistic and moralistic rhetorical frames, with an al-
most total absence of security-related words. Obama 
denounced Assad for “imprisoning, torturing, and 
slaughtering his own people,” and repeated his de-
mand that “President Assad must lead a democratic 
transition or get out of the way.” Yet, Obama also 
clearly signaled his unwillingness to apply any coercive 
instruments beyond economic sanctions to force Assad 
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from power. “The United States cannot and will not 
impose this transition upon Syria,” he declared, and as-
serted that the Syrian people themselves had ex-
pressed “their strong desire that there not be foreign 
intervention in their movement.” 
Table 4 maps the poetic structure of the first seven 
sentences of the above passage from Obama’s August 
2011 speech. This poetic analysis makes clear the em-
phatic boundaries that Obama drew between the “in-
group” of the American people and the “out-group” of 
the Syrians. It also highlights the passivity of the stance 
toward the Syrian conflict that Obama advocated. 
Table 4 reveals the strenuousness of President 
Obama’s effort to distance the U.S. government from 
the ongoing conflict in Syria. Unlike in his subsequent 
speech of September 2014 concerning ISIL, in which 
brave American pilots flying above the Middle East 
“felt the struggle” of the Yezidi, the American govern-
ment and people barely made an appearance here 
(apart from two uses of the word “we,” one of the 
“United States,” and one reference to the undesirabil-
ity of “foreign intervention”). Moreover, the verbs that 
Obama employed to describe American action, or inac-
tion (shown in boldface in Table 4), were remarkably 
passive. 
Table 4. President Assad is standing in the way. 
In-Group Verb Phrase Out-Group 
(+) = positively valued 
(-) = negatively valued 
The future of  Syria 
 must be determined by its people, (+) 
 but President Bashar al-Assad (-) 
 is standing in their way. (+) 
  His calls (-) 
 for dialogue and reform (+) 
 have rung hollow while he (-) 
 is imprisoning,  
 torturing, and  
 slaughtering his own people. (+) 
We have consistently said that President Assad (-) 
 must lead a democratic transition (+) 
 or get out of the way. (+) 
  He (-) 
 has not led. For the sake of the Syrian people, (+) 
 the time has come for President Assad (-) 
 to step aside.  
The United States cannot and  
 will not impose this transition (+) 
 upon Syria. 
 It is up to the Syrian people (+) 
 to choose their own leaders, and(+) 
we have heard their strong desire  
 that there not be  
foreign intervention in their movement….(+) 
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In the speech on the Yezidi, the Americans acted as 
saviors of innocents and vanquishers of terrorists, 
while the Yezidi were associated with passive verbs 
(“say,” “remember,” “owe”). In the August 2011 
speech on Syria, by contrast, the Americans were pas-
sive while the Syrians played the active roles. Obama 
noted that the U.S. government “has consistently said 
that President Assad must lead a democratic transi-
tion”; and that we “have heard” the Syrians’ “strong 
desire that there not be a foreign intervention.” The 
only active verbs concerning the U.S. government were 
employed in the negative: “The United States cannot 
and will not impose this transition upon Syria.” 
Over the subsequent two years, from August 2011 
until August 2013, President Obama barely mentioned 
Syria in his public speeches, apart from issuing a “red 
line” against the use of chemical weapons by the Assad 
regime in August 2012 (Obama, 2012b) and reiterating 
this warning in December of that year (Obama, 2012d). 
In his speech to the UN General Assembly of Septem-
ber 2011, Obama devoted two paragraphs to discuss-
ing Syria (Obama, 2011i); on the same occasion the fol-
lowing year, Obama devoted three paragraphs to the 
Syrian conflict (Obama, 2012c). 
The one great exception to Obama’s passive stance 
toward Syria concerned the use of chemical weapons 
by the Syrian regime. Obama repeatedly and forcefully 
made the case that the use of chemical weapons 
against Syrian civilians represented not just a violation 
of the laws of war, but also a direct threat to U.S. na-
tional security. For example, in his weekly address of 
September 7, 2013, Obama declared: 
We cannot turn a blind eye to images like the ones 
we’ve seen out of Syria. Failing to respond to this 
outrageous attack would increase the risk that 
chemical weapons could be used again; that they 
would fall into the hands of terrorists who might 
use them against us, and it would send a horrible 
signal to other nations that there would be no con-
sequences for their use of these weapons. All of 
which would pose a serious threat to our national 
security. (Obama, 2013b) 
Despite this vigorous rhetoric, Obama and his advi-
sors reportedly did not make an all-out effort to se-
cure Congressional approval for military strikes 
against Syria in September 2013 (Weiss, 2014). Ulti-
mately, the U.S. response to the Assad regime’s 
chemical weapons attacks was a diplomatic agree-
ment, brokered by the Russian government, under 
which the Syrian regime agreed to destroy its chemi-
cal weapons stock, but under which no one would be 
held accountable for war crimes against Syrian civil-
ians. Moreover, by focusing this agreement specifical-
ly on chemical weapons, the Obama administration 
tacitly withheld any objection to the Syrian regime’s 
commission of atrocities against its own civilians, pro-
vided that it utilized only conventional weapons to 
carry out these attacks. 
4.3. ISIL: “If You Threaten America…” 
In justifying military strikes against Libya in his speech-
es of March 2011, President Obama had framed his ar-
guments in moralistic as well as liberal internationalist 
terms. The shocking advance of ISIL forces from Syria 
into Iraq in the summer of 2014 brought this regional 
conflict back into focus for the U.S. public and its politi-
cal leaders. Obama again used moralistic appeals to 
advocate a muscular military response by the U.S. gov-
ernment. This time, however, the moralistic rhetoric 
was paired not with arguments grounded in interna-
tional law but with visceral security-related rhetoric 
reminiscent of the Bush administration’s Global War on 
Terror.  
Obama’s speech of September 10, 2014 announcing 
the expansion of U.S. military action against ISIL used 
the word “terror” or one of its variants 19 times, and 
the words “threat” or “threaten” 17 times. These ter-
rorist threats, he declared, warranted a decisive and 
uncompromising response: 
I have made it clear that we will hunt down terror-
ists who threaten our country, wherever they are. 
That means I will not hesitate to take action against 
ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle 
of my presidency: if you threaten America, you will 
find no safe haven. (Obama, 2014b) 
Table 5, which presents a poetic analysis of the above 
passage, makes clear how far Obama had moved from 
his passive stance vis-à-vis Syrian aggression in his 
speech of August 2011. In the earlier speech, the U.S. 
government was depicted as standing on the margins 
of the conflict in Syria, offering “support” for a “demo-
cratic, just, and inclusive” Syria. But now, the U.S. 
stood front and center in this conflict, taking an active 
and if necessary a belligerent role, ready to “hunt 
down terrorists who threaten our country.” 
This speech reveals Obama in full “threat and re-
sponse” mode. “[T]errorists…threaten,” he declares; “I 
will…take action.” And then: “you threaten,” but “you 
will find no safe haven.” In this speech the out-group 
has been rhetorically expanded to include not only 
“terrorists,” but also “you.” Furthermore, the bounda-
ries around the out-group have been hardened to 
comprise solely malevolent actors: “terrorists,” “ISIL,” 
and “you.” 
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Table 5. No safe haven for terrorists. 
 
Table 6. Countering violent extremism. 
In-Group Verb Phrase Out-Group 
(-) = negatively valued 
  Violent extremists and terrorists (-) 
 thrive when people of different religions or sects 
 pull away from each other 
 and are able to isolate each other 
 and label them as 
  “they” as opposed to 
“us”;  something separate and apart. 
So we need to build  
 and bolster bridges of communication  
 and trust.  
  Terrorists (-) 
 traffic in lies and stereotypes about others— 
  other religions, 
  other ethnic groups. 
So let’s share the truth of our faiths with  
each other.  Terrorists (-) 
 prey upon young impressionable minds. 
So let’s bring  
our youth together to promote understanding  
 and cooperation.  
 
 
In-Group Verb Phrase Out-Group 
(-) = negatively valued 
I have made it clear that  
We will hunt down terrorists who (-) 
 threaten  
our country, wherever they (-) 
 are. That means  
I will not hesitate  
 to take action against ISIL (-) 
  in Syria, (-) 
  as well as Iraq. (-) 
This is  
a core principle of   
my presidency: if you (-) 
 threaten  
America,  you (-) 
 will find no safe haven.  
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Lest this critique appear too harsh, it is important to 
acknowledge steps that the Obama administration has 
taken to advance a more holistic approach to counter-
terrorism and counterinsurgency. The promotion of ini-
tiatives for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is one 
of these steps. Some observers have criticized CVE as 
amounting to little more than “counterterrorism lite," 
arguing that outreach efforts to Muslim communities 
have been hampered by their security-centric orienta-
tion (Alliance for Peacebuilding et al., 2015).  
But the following passage from President Obama’s 
speech of February 19, 2015 at the Summit on Coun-
tering Violent Extremism, diagrammed in Table 6, sug-
gests the potential value of CVE initiatives in helping to 
soften the cultural divisions between in-groups and 
out-groups: 
Violent extremists and terrorists thrive when peo-
ple of different religions or sects pull away from 
each other and are able to isolate each other and 
label them as “they” as opposed to “us”; something 
separate and apart. So we need to build and bolster 
bridges of communication and trust. Terrorists traf-
fic in lies and stereotypes about others -- other reli-
gions, other ethnic groups. So let’s share the truth 
of our faiths with each other. Terrorists prey upon 
young impressionable minds. So let’s bring our 
youth together to promote understanding and co-
operation. (Obama, 2015b) 
Obama here presents a master class in how to elide 
rhetorical divisions between “them” and “us.” Rather 
than pulling “away from each other,” we must build 
“bridges of communication and trust.” Rather than 
trafficking in “lies and stereotypes about each other,” 
we must “share the truth of our faiths with each oth-
er.” Rather than allowing terrorists to “prey upon 
young impressionable minds,” we must “bring our 
youth together to promote understanding and cooper-
ation.”  
Though words without action are hollow, the invo-
cation of common ideals and common values can be a 
critical first step toward healing divisions across cultur-
al, and political, and sectarian lines. 
5. Conclusion: Expanding the In-Group 
In addressing the UN Security Council in September 
2013, President Obama identified four “core interests” 
of the United States in the Middle East and North Afri-
ca: to “confront external aggression against our allies 
and partners,” to “ensure the free flow of energy from 
the region to the world,” to “dismantle terrorist net-
works that threaten our people,” and to prevent the 
“development or use of weapons of mass destruction.” 
He declared that the “United States of America is pre-
pared to use all elements of our power, including mili-
tary force,” to secure these interests. Obama also al-
luded to other American interests in the region, such as 
“to promote democracy and human rights and open 
markets,” in order to help achieve “a Middle East and 
North Africa that is peaceful and prosperous.” Alt-
hough “we stand ready to do our part to prevent mass 
atrocities and protect basic human rights,” he cau-
tioned, “we cannot and should not bear the burden of 
acting alone” (Obama, 2013d). In effect, Obama drew a 
sharp line between the non-negotiable security inter-
ests of the United States—e.g. access to energy and 
the prevention of attacks on the American homeland—
and those of citizens of the region threatened by war 
or genocidal regimes. 
The deterioration of the international security envi-
ronment in the Middle East during the two years since 
Obama’s 2013 speech illustrates the shortcomings of 
this approach, which—whether intentionally or not—
appeared to elevate the significance of America’s 
“core” security interests above the humanitarian inter-
ests of other parties. The stunning rise of the Islamic 
State was facilitated by systematic assaults on legal and 
moral order—including mass atrocities in Syria and the 
breakdown of political and human rights protections 
for the Sunni minority of Iraq. This essay argues for a 
more expansive vision of security that acknowledges 
our moral obligations to others outside the boundaries 
of our national communities, and that recognizes the 
connection between U.S. national security and the se-
curity of civilians in conflict-affected regions. 
Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has 
deployed vast tactical and operational resources to 
fight terrorist organizations and insurgent movements 
at the tactical and operational level. It has devoted less 
systematic attention, however, to developing and im-
plementing a strategy to defeat terrorist organizations 
at the strategic level. As William Casebeer and James 
Russell have argued, 
A grand counter-terrorism strategy would benefit 
from a comprehensive consideration of the stories 
terrorists tell; understanding the narratives which 
influence the genesis, growth, maturation, and 
transformation of terrorist organizations will enable 
us to better fashion a strategy for undermining the 
efficacy of those narratives so as to deter, disrupt, 
and defeat terrorist groups. (Casebeer & Russell, 
2005) 
Because terrorist organizations are typically far weak-
er, in terms of their material resources, than the gov-
ernments against which they are fighting, they seek to 
find ways to leverage the resources of their opponents 
to support their own cause. Two common strategies 
for achieving this objective are what Audrey Kurth Cro-
nin calls provocation and polarization (Cronin, 2012, 
pp. 195-199; see also Cronin, 2015). 
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The provocation strategy involves efforts to en-
courage one’s opponent to overreach—for example by 
invading Iraq in response to a terrorist attack launched 
out of Afghanistan—thus depleting its resources and 
undermining its legitimacy. The polarization strategy at-
tacks the legitimacy of the targeted regime more direct-
ly. Through polarization operations, terrorist groups and 
other insurgencies seek to harden the boundaries be-
tween “us” and “them” (the in-group and the out-
group). They achieve this in part by smashing conven-
tional morality and the rule of law in their area of opera-
tions, often with the assistance of corrupt, despotic, or 
incompetent regimes against which they are fighting. 
Unsurprisingly, terrorist organizations are often 
strongest in regions with weak or predatory govern-
ments (for example, Somalia, Yemen, Northern Mali, 
Northeastern Nigeria, Eastern Syria, and Western Iraq). 
One of the seminal strategic texts cited by ISIL lead-
ers is The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical 
Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass, published 
online by Abu Bakr Naji in 2004. Naji argued that, in 
order to move Muslims toward “submission to the ad-
ministration” of the Islamic state, it was first essential 
to create conditions of “chaos” or “savagery,” as a re-
sult of which “a spontaneous kind of polarization be-
gins to happen among the people who live in the re-
gion of chaos” (Naji, 2004/2006, pp. 27, 110). At this 
point, he declared: 
The people, seeking security, rally around the great 
personages of the country or a party organization or 
a jihadi organization or a military organization com-
posed of the remainders of the army or the police of 
the regimes of apostasy. In this situation, the first 
step of polarizing these groups begins so that they 
may enter into mutual professions of loyalty with the 
people of truth by establishing administrative groups 
that are subordinate to us in the understanding of 
how to manage the regions which are under their 
control, along with undertaking proper media propa-
ganda concerning the situation of our regions with 
respect to the degree of security, justice by means of 
implementing the sharia, solidarity, preparation, 
training, and advancement. We will find (by the 
permission of God) that along with this first step 
there will be a continuous emigration of the youth of 
other regions to our regions in order to assist them 
and live in them, despite the loss of lives and worldly 
gains [lit. fruits] or the pressure of the enemies upon 
these regions. (Naji, 2004/2006, pp. 27, 110-111) 
Put more succinctly, a key strategic objective of the Is-
lamic State is the destruction of legal and moral au-
thority in the “region of chaos,” to be achieved in part 
through the commission of mass atrocities, with the 
goal of hardening the boundaries between the “in-
group” of the pious and the “out-group” of the infidels. 
Following Naji’s own logic, a comprehensive “coun-
ter-narrative strategy” (Casebeer & Russell, 2005) 
would aim to achieve the opposite objectives. It would 
seek to: 
1) strengthen the rule of law and human dignity in 
embattled regions; 
2) demonstrate our commitment to shared moral 
principles and our common humanity by pre-
venting mass atrocities and other attacks on ci-
vilians; and  
3) “expand the in-group” to include marginalized 
and oppressed populations, while emphasizing 
the firm boundary that exists between peaceful 
expression of legitimate grievances and criminal 
acts of violence. 
In other words, to quote President Obama, an effective 
global counterterrorism strategy would rest in part on 
a robust commitment to the principle that “preventing 
mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security 
interest and a core moral responsibility of the United 
States” (Obama, 2011f). In most cases, the fulfillment 
of this commitment would involve principally nonmili-
tary rather than military activities. As a coalition of in-
ternational NGOs declared in a recent joint statement 
on Countering Violent Extremism, “[A]ny strategy to 
address today’s complex threats [should] focus on sup-
porting communities and states to build safe, just, and 
resilient societies and addressing the core grievances 
fueling global radicalization” (Alliance for Peacebuilding 
et al., 2015). 
One of the most perplexing puzzles of the Obama 
presidency is why an individual so uniquely qualified to 
“expand the in-group”—the first African American 
president and perhaps the greatest orator of his gener-
ation, born to a father from Kenya and a mother from 
Kansas, raised in Hawaii and Indonesia—has often cho-
sen to harden the rhetorical boundaries between 
America and the outside world. In the opening para-
graphs of his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech of 
December 2009, Obama saw fit to remind his audi-
ence: “I am the Commander-in-Chief of the military of 
a nation in the midst of two wars” (Obama, 2009b). 
That same month, addressing the cadets of the U.S. 
Military Academy at West Point, he depicted America’s 
“overarching goal” in Afghanistan as to “disrupt, dis-
mantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Paki-
stan,” effectively reducing the security of the Afghan 
people themselves to an afterthought. “If I did not 
think that the security of the United States and the 
safety of the American people were at stake in Afghan-
istan,” he declared, “I would gladly order every single 
one of our troops home tomorrow” (Obama, 2009a). 
This hardening of rhetorical boundaries is evident in 
many of the speeches that Obama has delivered con-
cerning the crises in Libya, Syria, and Iraq. In discussing 
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the plight of the Yezidi, he could have asserted, in the 
spirit of John F. Kennedy’s Berlin address: “We are all 
Yezidi.” Instead, he settled for rhetorical virtuosity that 
enlisted moral outrage but highlighted the physical and 
cultural distance between the Yezidi and Americans. In 
addressing the threat posed by ISIL, he declared that “a 
core principle of my presidency” was the law of the 
jungle: “if you threaten America, you will find no safe 
haven” (Obama, 2014b). 
In The Obamians, a portrait of foreign policy deci-
sion-making during President Obama first term, James 
Mann observes that Obama and his closest advisors 
possessed “a distinctly more modest and downbeat 
outlook on America’s role in the world” than the for-
eign policy teams of the Clinton and the two Bush ad-
ministrations (Mann, 2012, p. 71). Obama and his advi-
sors found themselves hemmed in by the constraints of 
fiscal austerity and the blows to America’s confidence 
and international reputation caused by the global fi-
nancial crisis of 2008 and the military quagmires in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq. Consequently, “Obama sought to 
carve out a less assertive role for the United States, 
one in which it occasionally demonstrated its continu-
ing power and sought to preserve a leadership role in 
the world, but relied far more on the support of other 
countries” (Mann, 2012, p. 31). 
The present essay is intended as a counterpoint to 
this “doctrine of restraint,” which has served as an im-
plicit organizing principle for President Obama’s con-
duct of foreign policy. Precisely because American mili-
tary and economic power are increasingly contested 
and constrained, it is more important than ever for U.S. 
leaders to engage in robust efforts to craft and com-
municate a coherent strategic narrative that can enlist 
cooperation and support from America’s friends and 
international partners. A compelling strategic narrative 
cannot involve only words; it must involve words that 
express shared values and that are translated into ac-
tion. Protecting threatened civilians throughout the 
world from genocide and mass atrocities is one imper-
ative around which American interests and American 
values coalesce. 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to express my gratitude to Arald Begolli, 
who did the bulk of the background research for this 
paper, as well as to Jim Finkel and Anna Samson for 
their insightful advice and guidance, and to Michael Sil-
verstein for his mentorship and intellectual inspiration. 
Thanks also to the members of the Washington, DC-
based Atrocities Prevention Study Group for their help-
ful comments on a draft of the essay. 
Conflict of Interests 
The author declares no conflict of interests. 
References 
Albright, M., & Cohen, W. (2008). Preventing genocide: 
A blueprint for U.S. policymakers. Washington, DC: 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Ameri-
can Academy of Diplomacy, and the United States 
Institute of Peace. Retrieved from http://media. 
usip.org/reports/genocide_taskforce_report.pdf 
Alliance for Peacebuilding et al. (2015). A U.S. humani-
tarian, development, and peacebuilding statement 
on the U.S. global Countering Violent Extremism 
agenda. July 20. Retrieved from http://www. 
allianceforpeacebuilding.org/site/wp-content/up 
loads/2015/07/Statement-FINAL.pdf 
Arquilla, J., & Ronfeldt, D. (Eds.). (2001). Networks and 
netwars: The future of terror, crime, and militancy. 
Santa Monica: RAND. Retrieved from www.rand. 
org/publications/MR/MR1382 
Casebeer, W. D., & Russell, J. A. (2005). Storytelling and 
terrorism: Towards a comprehensive “counter-
narrative” strategy. Strategic Insights, 4(3). 
Chollet, D., & Fishman, B. (2015). Who lost Libya? 
Obama’s intervention in retrospect. Foreign Affairs, 
94(May/June), 154-157.  
Cronin, A. K. (2012). U.S. grand strategy and counter-
terrorism. Orbis, 56, 192-214. 
Cronin, A. K. (2015). ISIS is not a terrorist group. Why 
counterterrorism won’t stop the latest jihadist 
threat. Foreign Affairs, 94(March/April). Retrieved 
from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 
middle-east/2015-02-16/isis-not-terrorist-group 
Dorfman, L., Wallack, L., & Woodruff, K. (2005). More 
than a message: Framing public health advocacy to 
change corporate practices. Health Education & Be-
havior, 32, 320-336. 
Finkel, J. P. (2014). Atrocity prevention at the cross-
roads: Assessing the President’s Atrocity Prevention 
Board after two years. Center for the Prevention of 
Genocide Occasional Papers, No. 2. Washington, 
DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. 
Retrieved from http://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/ 
20140904-finkel-atrocity-prevention-report.pdf 
Freedman, L. (2006). The transformation of strategic 
affairs. The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Adelphi Paper 379. London: Routledge.  
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the 
organization of experience. New York: Harper & 
Row. 
International Crisis Group. (2012). Divided we stand: 
Libya’s enduring conflicts. Middle East/North Africa 




Jakobson, R. (1960). Closing statement: Linguistics and 
poetics. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), Style in language (pp. 
350-377). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 4, Pages 26-43 42 
Kahneman, D. (2003). Maps of bounded rationality: 
Psychology for behavioral economics. The American 
Economic Review, 93, 1449-1475. 
Lakoff, G. P. (1996). Moral politics: What conservatives 
know that liberals don’t. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press. 
Lakoff, G. P. (2004). Don’t think of an elephant: Know 
your values and frame the debate. White River 
Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing. 
Lempert, M., & Silverstein, M. (2012). Creatures of poli-
tics: Media, message, and the American presidency. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Levin, P. L., & Schneider, S. L. (1998). All frames are not 
created equal: A typology and critical analysis of 
framing effects. Organizational Behavior and Hu-
man Decision Processes, 76, 149-188. 
Levinger, M. (1990). La rhétorique protestataire du Par-
lement de Rouen (1753–1763). Annales—
Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations, 45, 589-613. 
Levinger, M. (2013). Conflict analysis: Understanding 
causes, unlocking solutions. Washington, DC: Unit-
ed States Institute of Peace Press. 
Mann, J. (2012). The Obamians: The struggle inside the 
White House to redefine American power. New 
York: Penguin. 
Martinez, S. M., Agoglia, J. F., & Levinger, M. (2013). Ef-
fective leadership for a complex world: A develop-
mental approach. In L. Wells II, T.C. Hailes, & M. C. 
Davies (Eds.), Changing mindsets to transform secu-
rity: Leader development for an unpredictable and 
complex world (pp. 53-80). Washington, DC: Na-
tional Defense University Center for Technology 
and National Security Policy. 
Naji, A. B. (2004/2006). The management of savagery: 
The most critical stage through which the umma 
will pass. Cambridge: John M. Olin Institute for Stra-
tegic Studies, Harvard University. 
Obama, B. (2004). Transcript of keynote address to the 
Democratic National Convention. The Washington 
Post. July 27. Retrieved from http://www.washingto 
npost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19751–2004Jul27.html 
Obama, B. (2009a). Remarks by the President in ad-
dress to the nation on the way forward in Afghani-




Obama, B. (2009b). Remarks by the President at the 




Obama, B. (2011a). President Obama speaks on the 
turmoil in Libya: “This violence must stop.” Febru-
ary 23. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse. 
gov/blog/2011/02/23/president-obama-speaks-
turmoil-libya-violence-must-stop 
Obama, B. (2011b). Remarks by the President on the 
situation in Libya. March 18. Retrieved from 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/03/18/remarks-president-situation-libya 
Obama, B. (2011c). Remarks by the President in ad-




Obama, B. (2011d). A statement by President Obama 
on Syria. April 22. Retrieved from https:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/04/22/statement-
president-obama-syria 
Obama, B. (2011e). Remarks by the President on the 




Obama, B. (2011f). Presidential Study Directive on 




Obama, B. (2011g). President Obama: “The future of 
Syria must be determined by its people, but Presi-
dent Bashar al-Assad is standing in their way.” Au-




Obama, B. (2011h). Remarks by President Obama at 
United Nations High-Level Meeting on Libya. Sep-
tember 20. Retrieved from https://www.white 
house.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/20/remarks-
president-obama-high-level-meeting-libya 
Obama, B. (2011i). Remarks by President Obama in ad-
dress to the United Nations General Assembly. Sep-




Obama, B. (2012a). Remarks by the President at the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. April 
23. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/2012/04/23/remarks-president-
united-states-holocaust-memorial-museum 
Obama, B. (2012b). Remarks by the President to the 
White House Press Corps: Syria red line press con-
ference. August 20. Retrieved from https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/ 
remarks-president-white-house-press-corps 
Obama, B. (2012c). Remarks by the President to the UN 




Obama, B. (2012d). Remarks by the President at the 
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 4, Pages 26-43 43 
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Sympo-




Obama, B. (2013a). Statement by the President on Syr-
ia. August 31. Retrieved from https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/state 
ment-president-syria 
Obama, B. (2013b). Weekly address: Calling for limited 




Obama, B. (2013c). Remarks by the President in ad-




Obama, B. (2013d). Remarks by President Obama in 
address to the United Nations General Assembly. 




Obama, B. (2014a). Statement by the President. August 
8. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
photos-and-video/video/2014/08/07/president-
obama-makes-statement-iraq#transcript 
Obama, B. (2014b). Statement by the President on ISIL. 
September 10. Retrieved from https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/ 
statement-president-isil-1 
Obama, B. (2014c). Statement by the President on air-




Obama, B. (2015a). Remarks by the President on re-
quest to Congress for authorization of force against 




Obama, B. (2015b). Remarks by the President at the 
Summit on Countering Violent Extremism. February 




Power, S. (2003). “A problem from hell”: America and 
the age of genocide. New York: HarperCollins. 
Scheufele, D. A. (1999). Framing as a theory of media 
effects. Journal of Communication, 49, 103-122. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of de-
cisions and the psychology of choice. Science 
211(4481), 453-458. 
United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID). (2015). Field guide: Helping prevent mass 
atrocities. Washington, DC: USAID. 
United States Department of Defense (DOD). (2012). 
Joint publication 3-07.3: Peace operations. Wash-
ington, DC: DOD. Retrieved from http://fas.org/ 
irp/doddir/dod/jp3-07-3.pdf 
United States Department of State. (2015). Quadrenni-
al Diplomacy and Development Review: Enduring 
leadership in a dynamic world. Washington, DC: 
United States Department of State. Retrieved from 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24
1429.pdf 
Weiss, M. (2014). The unraveling: How Obama’s Syria 
policy fell apart. Politico Magazine. January 2. Re-
trieved from http://www.politico.com/magazine/ 
story/2014/01/how-obamas-syria-policy-fell-apart-
101704_Page3.html#.VVSG-NpViko 
About the Author 
 
Dr. Matthew Levinger 
Matthew Levinger is Research Professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University. 
He directs the National Security Studies Program, an executive education program for senior officials 
from the U.S. government and its international partners, as well as the Master of International Policy 
and Practice Program. He served previously as Founding Director of the Academy for Genocide Pre-
vention at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and as Senior Program Officer at the Unit-
ed States Institute of Peace. He received his Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago. 
 
